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THE ACQUIRED VIRTUES ARE REAL VIRTUES:  
A RESPONSE TO STUMP
Brandon Dahm
In a recent paper, Eleonore Stump argues that Aquinas thinks the acquired 
virtues are “not real at all” because they do not contribute to true moral life, 
which she argues is the life joined to God by the infused virtues and the gifts 
and fruits of the Holy Spirit. Against this, I argue in two stages that Aquinas 
thinks the acquired virtues are real virtues. First, I respond to Stump’s four 
arguments against the reality of the acquired virtues. Second, I show four 
ways in which the acquired virtues contribute to the highest ethical life for 
Aquinas.
Introduction
In a recent paper, Eleonore Stump argues that Aquinas’s account of the 
moral life is not Aristotelian.1 Specifically, she argues that Aquinas does 
not think the acquired virtues contribute to the true ethical life, which she 
claims is the life joined to God by the infused virtues and the gifts and 
fruits of the Holy Spirit.2 Stump states her two theses succinctly:
(1) Aquinas recognizes the Aristotelian virtues, but he thinks that they are 
not real virtues.
(2) In fact, Aquinas goes so far as to maintain that the passions—or the suit-
ably formulated intellectual and volitional analogues to the passions—
are not only the foundation of any real ethical life but also the flowering 
of what is best in it. (31, numbering mine)
Stump first defends (1), her negative thesis, and then constructs a picture 
of Aquinas’s view of the “real ethical life” in support of (2), her positive 
1Eleonore Stump, “The Non-Aristotelian Character of Aquinas’s Ethics: Aquinas on the 
Passions,” Faith and Philosophy 28:1 (2011), 29–43. 
2Stump uses the phrases “real ethical life” (31), “true moral good” (33), “moral person” 
(34), “ethical life” (34), “optimal ethical condition” (39) to refer to this life. It is as involved 
in this life that we should read Stump explaining that the acquired virtues are “not real at 
all” (34). There is some worry that Stump’s negative thesis is simply that the acquired virtues 
are not the virtues by which we attain the unqualifiedly good life. If this is her thesis, then I 
have no disagreement with her. But then her paper is also not controversial amongst readers 
of Aquinas as she claims it is. In this paper, I read her negative claims as stronger than this, 
as they seem to be.
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thesis.3 Stump is clearly correct that Aquinas is not Aristotelian insofar 
as his ethics is more than Aristotelian, but this is uncontested. It is her 
stronger claim, (1), to which I object. I argue, against (1), that the acquired 
virtues contribute positively to the ethical life for Aquinas. After briefly 
explaining Stump’s positive account, I defend my thesis in two ways. First, 
I reply to each of Stump’s four arguments for (1). Second, I show four ways 
in which the acquired virtues contribute to the moral life for Aquinas: as 
perfections of the human good, as practical models of how to increase 
infused virtues, as preparatory to the reception of grace, and as aids to the 
infused virtues.
Although at some points it might seem like I am merely in verbal dis-
agreement with Stump in this paper, the truth of the matter is important 
for two reasons. First, the plausibility of Aquinas’s ethics is affected by 
whether he recognizes some moral worth in non-Christian or Aristotelian 
virtues or not.4 It is a severe cost of the view if it denies that non-Christian 
3Stump’s constructive account is similar to the account defended by her student Fr. An-
drew Pinsent. Although Stump references Pinsent’s dissertation, I refer to the later book, The 
Second-Person Perspective in Aquinas’s Ethics: Virtues and Gifts (New York: Routledge, 2012). In 
the section on Stump’s arguments for her negative thesis, I reference Pinsent’s similar, but 
usually more modest, arguments and claims. Although I do not engage her positive view, 
Leonard Ferry, in his recent paper, “Aristotle in Aquinas’s Moral Theory: Reason, Virtue, 
and Emotion,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association 87 (2013), 167–182, argues 
against Stump’s account of the relation between reason, emotions, and the moral life. Ferry 
makes a strong case in favor of a more traditional reading. Despite Ferry’s critiques and mine 
in this article, some of the positive account is plausible and rich. In “Friendship with the Holy 
Spirit,” Christian Reflection: A Series in Faith and Ethics, Pentecost (2015), 28–36, I build on the 
second personal part of the account of the gifts explained by Stump and Pinsent to discuss 
the role of the Holy Spirit in the Christian’s life.
4Stump’s paper contributes to an ongoing debate about the nature of the acquired and 
infused virtues in Aquinas. Although Stump does not situate her view in relation to the dis-
cussion, I appeal to some of the relevant literature. The following is a representative but not 
exhaustive survey of the recent discussion, which began as a reaction to some of MacIntyre’s 
comments about Aquinas. This is only the most recent iteration of thinkers struggling to 
understand the exact contours of Aquinas’s view, which some of the following makes clear. 
In “Moral Provincialism,” Religious Studies 30 (1994), 269–285, Bonnie Kent argues MacIntyre 
is committed to the view that only Christians can have true virtue for Aquinas. She discusses 
this further in her later book Virtues of the Will: The Transformation of Ethics in the Late Thir-
teenth Century (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1995), 19–34. 
Brian Shanley also argues against MacIntyre’s Augustinian reading of Aquinas in “Aquinas 
on Pagan Virtue,” The Thomist 63 (1999), 553–577. In defense of a more Augustinian reading 
of Aquinas, see Thomas M. Osborne, Jr., “The Augustinianism of Thomas Aquinas’s Moral 
Theory,” The Thomist 67 (2003), 279–305. Osborne later helpfully discusses and attempts to 
synthesize important texts in the discussion in “Perfect and Imperfect Virtues in Aquinas,” 
The Thomist 71 (2007), 39–64. Denis J. M. Bradley addresses the issue in Aquinas on the Twofold 
Human Good (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1999), chapter 
one. Angela McKay Knobel contributes the following two articles to the discussion: “Can 
Aquinas’s Infused and Acquired Virtues Coexist in the Christian Life?” Studies in Christian 
Ethics 23:4 (2010), 381–396, which helpfully surveys where some major Thomists landed in 
the previous iteration of this debate in the last generation; and “Aquinas and the Pagan Vir-
tues,” International Philosophical Quarterly 51:3 (2011), 339–354. William Mattison also has a 
pair of articles on the topic: “Thomas’s Categorizations of Virtue: Historical Background and 
Contemporary Significance,” The Thomist 74 (2010), 189–234, and “Can Christians Possess 
the Acquired Cardinal Virtues?,” Theological Studies 72 (2011), 558–585, in which he answers 
in the negative. Jennifer Herdt briefly discusses the relation of acquired and infused virtues 
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virtues are real virtues in any sense, which is what Stump seems to claim. If, 
as I argue, the Aristotelian virtues are real virtues that are imperfect relative 
to infused virtues, then the view doesn’t have this steep cost. Second, this 
is a lemma in the grace and nature debate. Getting at the relation between 
the infused and acquired virtues in Aquinas aids us in understanding the 
relationship between grace and nature for Aquinas. The plausibility of 
an account of the relation between grace and nature is due not only to a 
general statement of the view, e.g., “Grace perfects nature and does not do 
violence to it” for Aquinas, but how the view gets worked out in the de-
tails, e.g., in the relation between faith and reason, how the redemption of 
the environment is understood, the relation between church and state, etc. 
Each aspect of grace affecting nature then affects the character and plausi-
bility of the view as a whole. Thus, correcting the details provides us with 
a more accurate picture of the multi-faceted relation between grace and 
nature by which we can evaluate it.
Stump’s Constructive Account
In this section, I briefly explain Stump’s reasons for (2) and how it relates 
to her negative thesis. In the next section, I argue that each of Stump’s 
arguments for (1) fails, which opens up space for the acquired virtues to 
contribute to the “real ethical life.”
Stump begins by explaining the three tiers of dispositions in Aquinas’s 
ethical theory. On the first tier are the acquired or Aristotelian virtues. An 
acquired virtue, for example, temperance, is attained through repeated 
temperate acts. Aristotelian virtues order us to natural happiness. These 
are the virtues Stump thinks are not “real” virtues for Aquinas. The 
second tier has the infused virtues, which are true moral virtues. These 
must be given to us by God, i.e., infused, because they direct us to our su-
pernatural end, which is beyond our natural abilities to reach. In addition 
to infused versions of the acquired virtues, God gives the virtues of faith, 
hope, and love. On the third tier are the gifts of the Holy Spirit, which 
arise from the indwelling of the Holy Spirit in the Christian. The gifts act 
as promptings from the Holy Spirit that “have the effect of anchoring the 
infused theological virtues more deeply in a person’s psyche and enabling 
them to have their desired effect there” (35). Such assistance is needed in 
the Christian life, and so the gifts of the Holy Spirit are necessary for salva-
tion, according to Aquinas (Summa Theologiae [ST] I-II.68.2).
The gifts of the Holy Spirit, Stump thinks, should be understood as 
second-personal traits arising from the relationship between the Christian 
and the indwelling Holy Spirit. Second-personal knowledge of persons 
is non-propositional and perception-like in that it is “direct, immediate, 
intuitive in character, and basically reliable” (37). Some philosophers call 
in the third chapter of her Putting on Virtues (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008). 
Taking a somewhat more practical approach is Michael S. Sherwin, O.P., “Infused Virtue 
and the Effects of Acquired Vice: A Test Case for the Thomistic Theory of Infused Cardinal 
Virtues,” The Thomist 73 (2009): 29–52. 
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such knowledge “mind-reading” or “social cognition” because it provides 
us with a kind of insider understanding of another’s purposes, actions, 
and experience. Through charity and the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, we 
have a similar second-personal connection with God. So, a Christian “can 
know God’s presence and something of God’s mind in a direct and intui-
tive way that is in some respects like the mind-reading between persons” 
(37). Such a second-personal account is a helpful and plausible reading 
of what Aquinas calls “connatural knowledge” of persons, which is a 
kind of insight through inclination.5 As an example, the gift of wisdom 
allows one to judge correctly about divine things through a sympathy or 
connaturality with them, which is contrasted with the inquiry of reason 
that belongs to the intellectual virtue of wisdom. Explaining why the gift 
of wisdom is placed in the will, Aquinas notes, “Now this sympathy or 
connaturality for Divine things is the result of charity, which unites us to 
God” (ST II-II.45.2).6 So, through our attachment to God in charity, we are 
inclined to recognize the things of God intuitively.
Living according to the gifts of the Holy Spirit is the “optimal ethical 
condition” for a human person, but it is not the entire story (39). Stump 
finishes the account by explaining a three-tiered division in Aquinas’s 
account of the passions.7 In general, passions are movements of appetite 
towards or away from something. Encompassed within the various pas-
sions or movements of the appetite are desires, aversions, emotions, and 
feelings, among other things.8 On the first tier are movements of the sensi-
tive appetite. In themselves these are neither good nor bad, but counted 
good or bad by their relation to reason. Sensitive appetites can be disposed 
to obey reason, and such dispositions are virtues. The second tier has the 
intellectual passions, which are movements of the intellectual appetite. 
The initial movement of both types of appetite is love, or movement to-
wards the appropriate good. Finally, on the third tier are the fruits of the 
Holy Spirit. “Just as the virtues have analogues in the gifts of the Holy 
Spirit, so the passions also have analogues in the fruits of the Holy Spirit” 
(42). Stump explains that each of the fruits is second-personal. That is, 
5Like Stump’s second-personal reading, Jacques Maritain notes the importance of con-
natural knowledge in our knowledge of persons: “As I said at the beginning, knowledge 
through connaturality plays an immense part in human existence, especially in that knowing 
of the singular which comes about in everyday life and in our relationships of person to 
person.” “On Knowledge through Connaturality,” Review of Metaphysics 4:4 (1951), 473–481, 
at 475.
6Quotations from the Summa Theologiae are taken from the Dominican Fathers translation. 
Latin is from the Editiones Paulinae (1962). Huiusmodi autem compassio sive connaturalitas 
ad res divinas fit per caritatem, quae quidem unit nos Deo.
7Although both this division and the division of moral dispositions have three tiers, the 
divisions are not parallel as Stump explains them. The infused virtues have no special rela-
tion to the intellectual passions.
8With the recent interest in emotions has come renewed interest in Aquinas’s view of the 
passions. For example: Peter King, “Aquinas on the Emotions,” in The Oxford Handbook to 
Aquinas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 209–226; Robert Miner, Thomas Aquinas on 
the Passions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
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they are the result of the love between a human and God.9 For example, 
from this love flows joy at being united to God and peace because our 
desires rest in God (ST I-II.70.3). Stump concludes,
For Aquinas, then, the contribution of the fruits of the Holy Spirit to the 
moral life is not a matter of the passions being governed by reason, any more 
than it is in the case of the gifts of the Holy Spirit. Rather, the fruits of the 
Holy Spirit are a matter of having emotions, spiritual analogues to the pas-
sions, transformed in a second-personal connection to God. (42)
The fruits of the Holy Spirit, then, are the bloom of what is highest in the 
moral life.
Stump is correct that Aquinas is not Aristotelian in that his ethic is more 
than Aristotelian, which is uncontested. In this way, Stump’s support for 
her positive thesis—that for Aquinas the highest ethical life is the Chris-
tian life of infused virtue and gifts and fruits of the Holy Spirit—supports 
her negative thesis. Yet, this account is not enough to support her claim 
that the acquired virtues are not real virtues at all. Stump rightly thinks 
that the highest ethical life for Aquinas is the Christian life lived through 
the infused virtues and gifts of the Holy Spirit, but this does not entail that 
for Aquinas acquired virtues have no place in such a life. In defense of her 
negative thesis, Stump provides the four arguments to which I now turn.
Stump’s Arguments
Stump offers four main arguments that Aquinas did not think that the ac-
quired virtues are real virtues: arguments from (i) the definition of virtue, 
(ii) divine law, (iii) the unity of the virtues, and (iv) charity as a necessary 
condition for virtue. I summarize and reply to the arguments in order.
(i) Stump’s Argument From the Definition of Virtue
Stump begins by arguing that the acquired virtues are not real virtues 
because they do not satisfy the definition of virtue (32).10 In Summa Theo-
logiae I-II.55.4, Aquinas considers the adequacy of a standard definition 
of virtue (in his day) drawn from the writings of Augustine: “Virtue is a 
good quality of the mind, by which we live righteously, of which no one 
can make bad use, which God works in us, without us.”11 Stump notes that 
Aquinas says that “this definition comprises perfectly the whole essential 
notion (totam rationem) of virtue” (32). But, she argues, the acquired vir-
tues do not satisfy the last clause of the definition; otherwise they would 
be infused virtues instead of acquired. Thus, Aquinas thinks the acquired 
virtues are not real virtues.
9Stump sketches such a view in the article, but it is explained at length in Pinsent, The 
Second-Person Perspective, chapters 2–4.
10Cf. Pinsent, The Second-Person Perspective, 12–14.
11Virtus est bona qualitas mentis, qua recte vivitur, qua nullus male utitur, quam Deus in 
nobis sine nobis operatur.
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Yet this is not what Aquinas argues in the article in question. He ex-
plains that the essential notion or formula of something is gathered from its 
causes. When he considers the last clause of the definition, which picks out 
the efficient (the moving or agent) cause, he does not conclude with Stump 
that acquired virtue is not real virtue. Instead, he explains that the clause 
must be dropped in order for the definition to apply to virtue in general:
Lastly, God is the efficient cause of infused virtue, to which this definition 
applies; and this is expressed in the words “which God works in us without 
us.” If we omit this phrase, the remainder of the definition will apply to all virtues 
in general, whether acquired or infused. (ST I-II.55.4, emphasis mine)12
The final phrase, then, is dropped if we want to have a definition that 
applies to all virtue. So Aquinas does not think the formula excludes ac-
quired virtue from being real virtue.
My reading is confirmed in the nearly contemporaneous On the Vir-
tues in General, article two, in which Aquinas also considers the above 
definition of virtue.13 He begins his reply by explaining, “This definition 
includes in it the definition of virtue; moreover, if the last clause were 
omitted, it would also fit the whole of human virtue.”14 Then, after consid-
ering everything but the God clause of the definition, he says, “All these 
points, moreover, apply to moral as much as to intellectual, theological or 
infused virtues. Augustine’s additional phrase, ‘which God works in us 
without our help,’ applies only to infused virtues.”15
Finally, later in the same question, Aquinas considers an argument 
closely related to Stump’s:
Augustine says that virtue is a good quality of mind by which we live 
rightly, which no one can misuse, and which God works in us without our 
help. But if something comes about through our actions then God does not 
work this in us. Therefore virtue is not brought into being through our ac-
tions. (9, obj. 1)16
12Causa autem efficiens virtutis infusae, de qua definitio datur, Deus est. Propter quod 
dicitur, quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur. Quae quidem particula si auferatur, reliquum 
definitionis erit commune omnibus virtutibus, et acquisitis et infusis. 
13Jean-Pierre Torrell, O.P., puts the disputed questions on the virtues just after the Prima 
Secundae, which was written in 1271 while in Paris. “The disputed questions De virtutibus 
must be dated from Thomas’s second period of teaching in Paris, at the end of that period 
in 1271–1272, at the same time as the Secunda Secundae.” Saint Thomas Aquinas, Volume 1: The 
Person and His Work, trans. Robert Royal (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America 
Press, 2005). Translations of Disputed Questions on the Virtues taken from Cambridge edition, 
trans. E. M. Atkins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). The Latin is from the 
Marietti edition of the Quaestiones Disputatae, Volumen II, Editio IX revisa (Marietti Editori 
Ltd., 1953).
14Dicendum, quod ista definitio complectitur definitionem virtutis, etiam si ultima par-
ticula omittatur; et convenit omni virtuti humanae. 
15Haec autem omnia conveniunt tam virtuti morali quam intellectuali, quam theologicae, 
quam acquisitae, quam infusae. Hoc vero quod Augustinus addit quam in nobis sine nobis 
Deus operatur, convenit solum virtuti infusae. 
16Dicit enim Augustinus [lib. VI contra Iulianum, cap. vi] quod virtus est bona qualitas 
mentis, qua recte vivitur, qua nullus male utitur, quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur. Sed illud 
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Like Stump’s argument, this objection works from the last clause of Au-
gustine’s definition of virtue. Because Aristotelian virtues are our doing 
and not God’s, they are not virtues. Aquinas’s reply is brief, and he simply 
notes that Augustine is only speaking of the infused virtues:
Augustine is speaking here of those virtues through which we are ordered 
to eternal blessedness. (9, ad 1)17
As we saw in the passage from the ST above, Aquinas thinks the last 
clause distinguishes infused virtues from the larger set of virtues. The 
crucial point here is that when given a chance to deny the reality of the ac-
quired virtues, Aquinas goes the other direction. He simply explains that 
the Augustinian definition does not apply to all virtues. Thus, Stump’s 
first argument fails.
(ii) Stump’s Argument From Divine Law
Stump next argues that the value of acquired virtues cannot be “in ac-
cord with the true moral good” (33).18 Stump draws from an article where 
Aquinas is considering whether any virtue is caused in us by habituation. 
In other words, he is asking whether there are acquired virtues. He begins 
by explaining that human virtue perfects humans in relation to their good, 
which must “be appraised with respect to some rule” (ST I-II.63.2).19 Both 
human reason and divine law measure human virtue, the latter being 
wider in scope because it measures goods that are beyond reason, e.g., 
the beatific vision and the sacramental life, in addition to the goods that 
human reason appraises, e.g., political community and domestic life. 
These two sets of goods and rules relate to the twofold end of human 
beings. Although the details of the twofold end are controversial, Aquinas 
thought humans had both a natural end which is more like Aristotelian 
happiness and a supernatural end which consists in the intellectual vision 
of God in the next life.20 The former is measured by human reason, and the 
latter is measured by divine law. Virtues directed to the goods measured 
by human reason can be acquired, while goods measured only by divine 
law must be infused. Stump concludes from this that acquired virtues are 
not “in accord with” our true moral good (33).
I want to note again that in this article Aquinas is asking the question 
that Stump seems to be raising: Are there acquired virtues? That is, can we 
acquire habits that perfect us in relation to our good through habituation? 
Aquinas’s answer is clearly yes:
quod fit ex actibus nostris, non operatur Deus in nobis. Ergo virtus non causatur ex actibus 
nostris. 
17quod Augustininus loquitur de virtutibus secundum quod ordinantur ad aeternam 
beatitudinem.
18Cf. Pinsent, The Second-Person Perspective, 14–17.
19bonum hominis secundum aliquam regulam consideretur. 
20Cf. Denis J. M. Bradley, Aquinas on the Twofold Human Good (Washington, D.C.: The 
Catholic University of America Press, 1999).
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It follows that human virtue directed to the good which is defined according 
to the rule of human reason can be caused by human acts: inasmuch as such 
acts proceed from reason, by whose power and rule the aforesaid good is 
established. (ST I-II.63.2)21
Later Aquinas will explain that the range of goods measured by human 
reason includes every aspect of our nature (ST I-II.94.2). Aquinas is clear 
that acquired virtues do not perfect us in regard to our supernatural end, 
but he offers no indication that this excludes them from being real virtues. 
Thus Stump’s second argument also fails to show that the acquired virtues 
are not real virtues at all.
(iii) Stump’s Argument From the Unity of the Virtues
Stump then argues that the acquired virtues are not real virtues because, 
unlike real virtues, they are not connected.22 She begins, “In discussing the 
unity of the virtues, Aquinas maintains that the thesis does not hold of the 
Aristotelian virtues, but does hold of the infused virtues” (33). The virtues 
are unified or connected in the relevant sense if they stand or fall together. 
According to the unity of the virtues thesis, then, for example, one can be 
courageous only if he is also prudent, just, and temperate. The virtues are 
deeply connected on such a view, so that acquiring one virtue requires ac-
quiring others. Stump claims that Aquinas thinks the unity of the virtues 
thesis holds only for perfect virtues, and the acquired virtues are only 
imperfect virtues. Therefore, the acquired virtues are not real virtues.
The problem with this argument is that Aquinas thinks the acquired 
virtues are connected, which he argues in both of his major treatments of 
this question.23 The longer treatment, On the Cardinal Virtues, article two, 
begins by making the following distinction:
We can speak about the virtues in two ways: (i) about the virtues as imper-
fect; (ii) about them as perfect. The perfect virtues are interconnected, but the 
imperfect virtues are not necessarily interconnected. (On the Cardinal Virtues, 
a. 2, emphasis in original)24
A perfect virtue, Aquinas continues, is one “that makes a person and what 
he does perfectly good,”25 but an imperfect virtue only makes a person 
and what he does good “in some respect” (ibid.).26 Perfect virtues are 
perfect relative to some measure. As we saw in the last section, Aquinas 
21Virtus igitur hominis ordinata ad bonum quod modificatur secundum regulam rationis 
humanae, potest ex actibus humanis causari: inquantum huiusmodi actus procedunt a ra-
tione, sub cuius potestate et regula tale bonum consistit. 
22Cf. Pinsent, The Second-Person Perspective, 19–20.
23On the Cardinal Virtues, a. 2; ST I-II.65.1.
24Dicendum, quod de virtutibus dupliciter possumus loqui: uno modo de virtutibus per-
fectis; alio modo de virtutibus imperfectis. Perfectae quidem virtutes connexae sibi sunt; 
imperfectae autem virtutes non sunt ex necessitate connexae. (emphasis in original.) 
25illa est virtus perfecta quae perfecte opus hominis bonum reddit, et ipsum bonum facit. 
26sed quantum ad aliquid.
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thinks human acts and virtues are measured by two rules: right reason, 
which corresponds “strictly to human nature,” and God (or “divine law”), 
which transcends human nature. In other words, some perfect virtues are 
acquired virtues and some are infused virtues. The twofold measure di-
vides up the category of perfect virtue, giving us three levels of virtue:27 
imperfect virtue, perfect virtue relative to right reason, and perfect virtue 
relative to divine law.28
First, there are wholly imperfect (omnino imperfectae) virtues, which 
Aquinas does not think are connected (On the Cardinal Virtues, a. 2). Al-
though someone, let’s say a judge, might have a disposition to act justly 
and thus make just rulings, if that person is not chaste, her justice might 
be compromised. For example, the judge’s lack of chastity might contami-
nate her justice in cases of sexual misconduct.29 Thus, although the judge’s 
justice-like habit does dispose her to just actions, it fails to meet either 
measure of human action. Dispositions that are habits in this way are not 
connected.
The second level of virtue is those virtues that attain right reason but 
not God.30 These are the acquired virtues. Aquinas thinks the acquired vir-
tues are connected through prudence. It is by the virtue of prudence that 
we attain our end well, which is required for the cardinal moral virtues, 
i.e., justice, courage, and temperance. But it is the moral virtues that aim 
prudence in the right direction by providing the right ends to attain. Thus, 
the acquired virtues are connected by the interdependence of prudence 
and the moral virtues. Although these virtues are perfect insofar as they 
attain right reason, they are imperfect insofar as they do not attain God. 
So, when compared to wholly imperfect virtue and measured by right 
reason, the acquired virtues are perfect virtues that are connected. But 
they fail to meet the standard that transcends our nature, which is God or 
divine law.
The third level of virtue involves “unqualifiedly perfect virtues” (vir-
tutum simpliciter perfectarum) (On the Cardinal Virtues, a. 2). These are the 
infused virtues by which we attain our supernatural end, God. The central 
infused virtue is charity, by which we become friends of God and live out 
that friendship. Aquinas argues that those who have charity also need to 
be given the other infused virtues and concludes that the infused virtues 
are connected by charity, which is their form. With all of this in the back-
ground, Aquinas concludes the article:
27Sic igitur est triplex gradus virtutum (Ibid).
28In his excellent paper “Perfect and Imperfect Virtues in Aquinas,” The Thomist 71 (2007): 
39–64, Thomas Osborne notes the varieties of perfect and imperfect virtues in Aquinas’s 
various discussions. He explains various ways of putting the seemingly orthogonal sets of 
distinctions together and then argues for a five-fold schema. Whatever the exact number is, 
the three-fold division given here is the smallest plausible reading. 
29I thank Nancy Snow for the contamination metaphor and example.
30Secundus autem gradus virtutum est illarum quae attingunt rationem rectam, non tamen 
attigunt ad ipsum Deum per caritatem. 
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If, then, we take the virtues as unqualifiedly perfect, they are connected be-
cause of charity, because no virtue can be of this sort without charity, and 
once you possess charity you possess all the virtues. However, if we take 
the virtues as perfect at the second level, with reference to the human good, 
they are connected through practical wisdom, because no moral virtue can 
exist without practical wisdom and we cannot possess practical wisdom if 
any of the moral virtues are lacking. (On the Cardinal Virtues, a. 2, emphasis 
in original)31
It is clear from this article that Aquinas thinks that the acquired virtues are 
connected through prudence.32 Thus, contra Stump, Aquinas thinks the 
unity of the virtues thesis holds of the Aristotelian virtues.
(iv) Stump’s Argument From the Necessity of Charity
Last, Stump argues that the acquired virtues are not real virtues according 
to Aquinas because he thinks real virtues require charity. Stump appeals 
to ST I-II.65.2, in which Aquinas considers whether moral virtues can exist 
without charity. Building on the previous article in which he argued that 
the moral virtues are connected through prudence, Aquinas argues that 
the moral virtues can exist in us without charity although they are im-
perfect. In order for her argument to work, Stump must read “imperfect” 
as referring to the first level of virtue above—wholly imperfect virtues, 
which are not really virtues at all.
As we have seen, though, Aquinas also refers to the second tier of virtue 
as “imperfect.” When considering virtues existing without charity else-
where, Aquinas calls such virtues “true but imperfect virtues” (vera virtus, 
sed imperfecta) (ST II-II.23.7). Aquinas thereby identifies the second cate-
gory of virtues from the previous section, i.e., virtue that is perfect relative 
to right reason but imperfect relative to divine law.33 It is clear, then, that 
31Sic ergo, si accipiamus virtutes simpliciter perfectas, connectuntur propter caritatem; 
quia nulla virtus talis sine caritate haberi potest, et caritate habita omnes habentur. Si autem 
accipiamus virtutes perfectas in secundo gradu, respectu boni humani, sic connectuntur per 
prudentiam; quia sine prudentia nulla virtus moralis esse potest, nec prudentia haberi po-
test, si cui deficiat moralis virtus. (emphasis in original.) 
32The shorter treatment in ST I-II.65.1 begins by distinguishing between perfect and im-
perfect moral virtue. The latter is merely an inclination towards some kind of good deed. 
These are the wholly imperfect virtues of the On the Cardinal Virtues passage. Imperfect virtues 
like these are not connected because one can have an inclination towards courageous acts 
without having an inclination towards chaste acts. Perfect moral virtues, however, incline 
us to do a good deed well. “If we take moral virtues in this way, we must say they are con-
nected, as nearly all are agreed in saying.” (Et sic accipiendo virtutes morales, dicendum est 
eas connexas esse; ut fere ab omnibus ponitur.) Aquinas goes on to explain that perfect moral 
virtues are connected in different ways depending on how one differentiates the virtues. 
Thomas Osborne agrees with my reading: “Consequently it seems unlikely that [Aquinas] 
is here stating the infused virtues are connected whereas the acquired are not. Instead, he 
is pointing out that they are connected in different ways, the first through charity and the 
second through prudence.” (Osborne, “Perfect and Imperfect Virtues,” 55).
33On Osborne’s division of the grades of virtue, true but imperfect virtue and perfect 
acquired virtue are distinct. Whether there are one or two grades of virtue in this region does 
not make a difference to my argument. 
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Aquinas considers the acquired virtues to be virtues, although imperfect 
in relation to our supernatural end. So, Stump’s final argument fails.
An examination of Stump’s arguments and Aquinas’s positions shows 
that although Aquinas considers the acquired virtues to be imperfect rela-
tive to the infused virtues, he thinks they are real virtues that perfect their 
subjects.34 Our question, then, is, do the acquired virtues contribute to the 
Christian life? In the next section, I argue that they do.
Moral Value of Acquired Virtues
In this section I argue that according to Aquinas the acquired virtues 
contribute to the supernatural moral life in four different ways: (a) as per-
fections of the human good, (b) as practical models of how to increase 
infused virtues, (c) by disposing us to receive the infused virtues, and (d) 
by aiding the infused virtues in helping us resist sin and assisting in the 
performance of virtuous acts. I briefly consider the first three and then 
focus on (d), which is the primary way the acquired virtues contribute to 
the Christian life.
(a) As I showed in the last section, Aquinas is clear that the acquired vir-
tues are perfections of the human good as measured by reason. The good 
that we are able to comprehend and achieve by our natural capacities is the 
standard by which these acquired habits are judged to be virtues, because 
they promote acting well and thereby the attainment of natural happiness. 
The relation between our two ends has been the subject of much debate, 
and this is not the place to enter into the details of those debates.35 How-
ever, I think it is clear that natural happiness, although imperfect relative 
to supernatural happiness, is truly good. Aquinas explains that it is truly 
good in relation to supernatural happiness because it can be ordered to it:
Virtue is ordered to the good, as stated above (I-II, 55, 4). Now the good is 
chiefly an end, for things directed to the end are not said to be good except in 
relation to the end. Accordingly, just as the end is twofold, the last end, and 
the proximate end, so also, is good twofold, one, the ultimate and universal 
good, the other proximate and particular. The ultimate and principal good 
of man is the enjoyment of God, according to Psalm 72:28: “It is good for me 
to adhere to God,” and to this good man is ordered by charity. Man’s second-
ary and, as it were, particular good may be twofold: one is truly good, because, 
considered in itself, it can be directed to the principal good, which is the last end; 
while the other is good apparently and not truly, because it leads us away 
from the final good. (emphasis mine, II-II.23.7)36
34Stump offers another argument from the compossibility of acquired virtues and mortal 
sin (34). The reply to this objection is clear from the other replies.
35For a rigorous account of the two ends and a survey of the relevant debates, see Denis J. 
M. Bradley, Aquinas on the Twofold Human Good (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University 
of America Press, 1999). For a survey and discussion of the two ends and our desire for them, 
see Lawrence Feingold, The Natural Desire to See God According to St. Thomas Aquinas and His 
Interpreters (Ave Maria, FL: Sapientia Press, 2010). 
36Respondeo dicendum quod virtus ordinatur ad bonum, ut supra habitum est. Bonum 
autem principaliter est finis: nam ea quae sunt ad finem non dicuntur bona nisi in ordine 
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The division here is like the threefold division of virtue above. The true 
but imperfect virtues are those virtues that perfect us in relation to the 
true but particular end, natural happiness. Aquinas explains that this is 
truly good because it can be ordered to our universal good, which is su-
pernatural happiness.
Therefore, the good to which the acquired virtues are ordered is a true 
good. It then makes sense that the acquired virtues truly help make us 
good, which is how Aquinas talks about them. In each case of distin-
guishing the acquired virtues from the infused virtues, Aquinas is clear 
that these virtues make their possessors good. Although these acquired 
goods are not good without qualification as the infused virtues are, 
Aquinas thinks that they are real goods. Thus, they have real moral value.
(b) The acquired virtues also act as practical models of how to increase 
in infused virtue. On Aquinas’s account, the acquired virtues are acquired 
through habituation. So, for example, it is the repeated performance of 
temperate actions that causes the disposition towards performing further 
temperate actions, which is the virtue of temperance (On the Virtues in 
General, 9; ST I-II.63.2). Infused virtues similarly grow in intensity after ac-
tion. But, Aquinas thinks, the infused virtues have a very different causal 
story. Repeated use does not increase the infused virtues in the same 
way because they must be increased by their cause, which is God (On the 
Virtues in General, 11). But, “Our own actions, too, can be related to the 
increase of charity and the infused virtues as tendencies, in the same way 
that they make us tend toward receiving charity in the first place. For we 
can do what is in our own power to prepare ourselves to receive charity 
from God” (On the Virtues in General, 11).37 Moreover, because action that 
arises from infused virtues proceeds from charity, it is meritorious (On the 
Virtues in General, 11). Through this merit, God causes the infused virtue to 
increase. Thus, the actions of infused virtues merit their increase. Aquinas 
summarizes in reply to an objection, “Charity and the other infused vir-
tues, as I have argued, are increased by actions as being dispositions and 
as being meritorious, rather than as being active” (On the Virtues in General, 
11, ad 14, emphasis in original).38 God is the active principle of the increase 
of the infused virtues, but repeated action plays an important part of the 
explanation.
ad finem. Sicut ergo duplex est finis, unus ultimus et alius proximus, ita etiam est duplex 
bonum: unum quidem ultimum, et aliud proximum et particulare. Ultimum quidem et prin-
cipale bonum hominis, est Dei fruitio, secundum illud Psalm. [Ps. 72, 28]: Mihi adhaerere Deo 
bonum est: et ad hoc ordinatur homo per caritatem. Bonum autem secundarium et quasi 
particulare hominis potest esse duplex: unum quidem quod est vere bonum, utpote ordina-
bile, quantum est in se, ad principale bonum, quod est ultimus finis; aliud autem est bonum 
apparens et non verum, quia abducit a finali bono. 
37Actus autem nostri comparantur ad augmentum caritatis et virtutum infusarum, ut 
disponentes, sicut ad caritatem a principio obstinendam; homo enim faciens quod in se est, 
praeparat se, ut a Deo recipiat caritatem.
38caritas et aliae virtutes infusae non augentur active ex actibus, sed tantum dispositive et 
meritorie, ut dictum est [loc. cit.].
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So, although from a metaphysical perspective the causal story is dif-
ferent, what we do to increase in virtue has practical similarities across 
acquired and infused virtues (On the Virtues in General, 10, ad 19). That is, 
if we wish to grow in virtue, whether it be an infused or acquired virtue, 
we should perform the actions characteristic of that virtue.39 Here, then, 
acquired virtues contribute to the moral life by offering us a model of how 
to grow in virtue.
(c) Third, the acquired virtues dispose us to receive infused virtues by re-
moving obstacles to grace. Speaking of habitual grace, which is the infused 
grace involved in the Christian life, Aquinas writes, “a certain preparation 
of grace is required for it, since a form can only be in disposed matter” (ST 
I-II.112.2).40 One important element of this preparation for Aquinas can be 
the acquired virtues. Of course, the role of the agent in preparing himself 
for receiving grace is a theological minefield. To assuage Pelagian and 
semi-Pelagian concerns, which Stump recognizes Aquinas is operating in 
light of, let me make two things clear.41 First, Aquinas unambiguously ar-
gues that the initial infusion of grace is unmerited (ST I-II.114.5). Second, 
although infused grace is not required as a preparation for infused grace 
(otherwise there would be an infinite regress), humans are not able to 
prepare themselves for grace “except by the gratuitous help (auxilium 
gratuitum) of God” moving us inwardly (ST I-II.109.6).42 Aquinas does not 
conclude from these claims, though, that nothing we do is preparatory for 
grace. Instead, it is in light of these claims that we must understand Aqui-
nas’s further claim that our actions can dispose us towards grace: “For we 
can do what is in our own power to prepare ourselves to receive charity 
from God” (On the Virtues in General, 11).43 Without attempting to explain 
exactly how our actions can and cannot prepare us for grace, I argue for 
one way in which the acquired virtues prepare us for the infused virtues.
When considering whether there are infused virtues, Aquinas explains, 
“Although infused virtue is not brought about through our actions, our 
actions can still dispose us to it” (On the Virtues in General, 10, ad 17).44 How 
are our actions and acquired virtues able to dispose us towards grace? 
Aquinas explains that one way is by removing obstacles:
On the other hand, some virtues can precede faith accidentally. For an ac-
cidental cause precedes its effect accidentally. Now that which removes an 
obstacle is a kind of accidental cause, according to the Philosopher (Phys. 
viii, 4): and in this sense certain virtues may be said to precede faith accidentally, in 
39This is not to say that we shouldn’t do other things, like pray and receive the sacraments, 
which deepen our friendship with God and increase our receptivity to infused virtue. 
40Praeexigitur ad gratiam aliqua gratiae praeparatio: quia nulla forma potest esse nisi in 
materia disposita. 
41See chapters 12 and 13 of Aquinas (New York: Routledge, 2003).
42Unde patet quod homo non potest se praeparare ad lumen gratiae suscipiendum, nisi 
per auxilium gratuitum Dei interius moventis. 
43homo enim faciens quod in se est, praeparat se, ut a Deo recipiat caritataem.
44quod licet virtus infusa non causetur ex actibus, tamen actus possunt ad eam disponere.
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so far as they remove obstacles to belief. Thus fortitude removes the inordinate 
fear that hinders faith; humility removes pride, whereby a man refuses to 
submit himself to the truth of faith. The same may be said of some other 
virtues, although there are no true virtues, unless faith be presupposed (non 
sint verae virtutes nisi praesupposita fide), as Augustine states (Contra Julian. iv, 
3). (ST II-II.4.7, emphasis mine)45
In this text, Aquinas both explains how the acquired virtues can dispose 
us to receive infused virtues, specifically faith, and emphasizes the im-
perfection of the acquired virtues. As we saw above, Aquinas thinks the 
acquired virtues are imperfect relative to the infused virtues, which is what 
he notes by explaining that there are “no true virtues,” i.e., unqualifiedly 
perfect virtues, “unless faith be presupposed.” Despite their imperfection, 
Aquinas still thinks the acquired virtues prepare us to receive infused 
virtues by removing obstacles to them. So, Aquinas thinks that acquired 
virtues have a third role in the Christian life: they dispose us towards its 
beginning.
(d) The fourth contribution the acquired virtues make to the real ethical 
life is as aids to the infused virtues. The acquired virtues help us on our 
way to the ultimate end. When considering whether the acquired virtues 
will remain in the next life, Aquinas, agreeing with Gregory, explains that 
these virtues “complete us for our active life, a sort of journey by which 
we reach the goal of contemplation in our homeland” (On the Cardinal Vir-
tues, 4, ad 1).46 Aquinas explains that this journey is governed by charity:
Now charity inclines us towards all sorts of virtuous activity, because it com-
mands the activities of all the other virtues, since it is concerned with the 
ultimate end: for a skill or a virtue that includes a certain end, also governs 
whatever concerns that end, just as a military skill commands horsemanship 
and a horseman’s skill that of a saddler, as Aristotle says. That is why the 
dispositions of all the other virtues are infused into us along with charity, 
because God’s wisdom and goodness does what is fitting. (On the Cardinal 
Virtues, 2)47
The perfect, acquired virtues have just the sort of end, natural human hap-
piness, that is ordainable to a higher end, supernatural human happiness 
45Sed per accidens potest aliqua virtus esse prior fide. Causa enim per accidens est per 
accidens prior. Removere autem prohibens pertinent ad causam per accidens: ut patet per 
philosophum, in VIII Physic. Et secundum hoc aliquae virtutes possunt dici per accidens pri-
ores fide, inquantum removent impedimenta credendi: sicut fortitudo removet inordinatum 
timorem impedientem fidem; humilitas autem superbiam, per quam intellectus recusat se 
submittere veritati fidei. Et idem potest dici de aliquibus aliis virtutibus: quamvis non sint 
verae virtutes nisi praesupposita fide, ut patet per Augustinum, in libro contra Iulianum. 
46quod huiusmodi virtutes perficiunt hominem in vita activa, sicut in quadam via qua 
pervenitur ad terminum contemplationis patriae.
47Oportet igitur quod similiter cum caritate infundantur habituales formae expedite pro-
ducentes actus ad quos caritas inclinat. Inclinat autem caritas ad omnes actus virtutum, quia 
cum sit circa finem ultimum, importat omnes actus virtutum. Quaelibet enim ars vel virtus 
ad quam pertinet finis, imperat his quae sunt circa finem, sicut militaris equestri, et equestris 
frenorum factrici, ut dicitur in I Ethicor. [cap. i et ii] Unde secundum decentiam divinae 
sapientiae et bonitatis, ad caritatem simul habitus omnium virtutum infunduntur.
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(ST II-II.23.7). Charity’s ordering of the other virtues to a higher end is why 
Aquinas calls charity the “form of the virtues” (forma virtutum) (ST II-II.23.8). 
“Charity is said to be the end of other virtues, because it directs all other 
virtues to its own end” (ST II-II.23.8.ad 3).48 Through its connection to our 
ultimate end, charity directs the acquired virtues by commanding their acts 
for its purposes and thus orders them to a higher end (ST II-II.23.8.ad 3).49 
Aquinas supports this point with a metaphysical argument in On Charity, 
article three:
It is clear that the act of all the other virtues is ordered to the proper end 
of charity, which is its object, viz., the highest good. This is certainly clear 
regarding the moral virtues, for virtues of this kind are concerned with 
certain created goods which are ordered to the uncreated good as to their 
final end.50 
Thus, the general ordainability of the acquired virtues to our ultimate 
end supports the thesis that the acquired virtues contribute to the Chris-
tian life.
In further support of the claim that the acquired virtues aid the infused 
virtues in the Christian life, I now explain a way in which the acquired vir-
tues help the Christian avoid temptation and a way in which the acquired 
virtues help the Christian perform acts of charity. Although Aquinas 
doesn’t think that the passions that incline us towards sin can be com-
pletely eradicated in this life aside from a miracle (On the Virtues in General, 
10, ad 14), the virtues help us overcome such passions. On the one hand, 
48caritas dicitur finis aliarum virtutum quia omnes alias virtutes ordinat ad finem suum. 
“Since we can merit nothing without charity, the actions of an acquired virtue cannot have 
merit without charity. However, the other virtues are infused in us together with charity; 
that is how the actions of an acquired virtue can be meritorious only by means of an infused 
virtue. For a virtue that is ordered towards a lower end can only bring about actions that 
are ordered to a higher end if this is done by means of a higher virtue.” (Quod cum nullum 
meritum sit sine caritate, actus virtutis acquisitae, non potest esse meritorious sine caritate. 
Cum caritate autem simul infunduntur aliae virtutes; unde actus virtutis acquisitae non po-
test esse meritorious nisi mediante virtute infusa. Nam virtus ordinata in finem inferiorem 
non facit actus ordinatum ad finem superiorem, nisi mediante virtute superiori.) (On the 
Virtues in General, 10, ad 4).
 “Therefore, when the actions of temperateness or of courage are governed by charity, 
which orders them to their final end, the actions take their type, as regards form, from that; 
formally speaking they are actions of charity. It would not follow from this, however, that 
temperateness or courage themselves should take their type from that.” (Non igitur tempe-
rantia et fortitudo infusae differunt specie ab acquisitis ex hoc quod imperantur a caritate 
earum actus; sed ex hoc quod earum actus secundum eam rationem sunt in medio constituti, 
prout ordinabiles ad ultimum finem qui est caritatis obiectum.) (On the Virtues in General, 10, 
ad 10). 
49Note that charity’s causality as director is somewhat different than the capital vices’ 
causality as director. Thus, Aquinas explains, “a capital vice is one from which other vices 
arise, chiefly by being their final cause, which origin is formal.” (Et sic dicitur vitium capitale 
ex quo alia vitia oriuntur: et praecipue secundum originem causae finalis, quae est formalis 
origo, ut supra dictum est.) (ST I-II.84.3). 
50Manifestum est autem quod actus omnium aliarum virtutum ordinatur ad finem pro-
prium caritatis, quod est eius obiectum, scilicet summum bonum. Et de virtutibus quidem 
moralibus manifestum est: nam huiusmodi virtutes sunt circa quaedam bona creata quae 
ordinantur ad bonam increatum sicut ad ultimum finem.
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infused virtues, as long as they remain in us, help us “refrain totally from 
obeying sinful desires” for mortal sin (On the Virtues in General, 10, ad 14).51 
Acquired virtues, on the other hand, keep us from following sinful desires 
“to the extent that the struggle is felt less” (On the Virtues in General, 10, 
ad 14).52 The process of acquiring the virtue—habituation—transforms the 
virtue’s subject in such a way that contrary passions are felt less. Weaker 
desires draw us towards sin less, and thus the acquired virtues aid the 
Christian in avoiding sin.
In his defense of the practical need for the infused virtues, Michael 
Sherwin, O.P., provides an example of this.53 Sherwin is concerned with 
cases of adult converts who have acquired vices instead of virtues. His case 
study is Matt Talbot. Talbot was an alcoholic from his teenage years until 
his early thirties, when he became a Christian.54 There was no question of 
the relation of acquired temperance and infused temperance for Talbot, 
who lived to drink.55 After converting and receiving infused temperance, 
Talbot continued to desire not only to drink to excess but also to live his 
old life, where such drinking was the point. Yet, he never drank again and 
eventually didn’t desire to. How did Talbot remove the lingering effects of 
his acquired vice? Sherwin answers:
The most obvious answer seems to be that he does this by doing good ac-
tions that are contrary to his disordered inclinations. Repeated good actions, 
however, do more than just destroy disordered inclinations, they also de-
velop good dispositions within us. These good dispositions are what we 
normally call acquired virtues.56
Once in possession of acquired temperance, avoiding drink was no longer 
a struggle for Talbot.
Acquired virtues also aid the Christian in performing good acts. If the 
Christian already has the infused virtues and the gifts and fruits of the 
Holy Spirit, why does she need to use the acquired virtues to perform 
the virtuous action? As we just saw, the acquired virtues transform the 
appetites in a way that the infused virtues do not. For this reason, infused 
virtue “does not in the same way give pleasure straight away” (On the 
51Virtus enim infusa facit quod nullo modo obediatur concupiscentiis peccati; et facit hoc 
infallibiliter ipsa manente.
52Virtus enim acquisita praevalet quantum ad hoc quod talis impugnatio minus sentitur. 
53Sherwin, “Infused Virtue.”
54Of course, explaining Talbot’s case as a case of vice should not be taken to imply that al-
coholism or addiction is simply a vice. See Kent Dunnington, Addiction and Virtue (Downers 
Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2011) for a helpful discussion of addiction in relation to habits, 
and Daniel De Haan, “Thomistic Hylomorphism, Self-Determination, Neuroplasticity, and 
Grace: The Case of Addiction,” Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: 
Science, Reason, and Religion 85 (2011), 99–120 for a penetrating discussion of the many onto-
logical layers involved in a Thomistic analysis of addiction.
55Sherwin, “Infused Virtue,” 35–37.
56Ibid., 49.
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Virtues in General, 10, ad 15).57 An acquired virtue, however, “makes us 
do things readily and with pleasure” (On the Cardinal Virtues, 2, ad 2).58 
Adapting an example Aquinas uses elsewhere, Christians with infused 
virtues but not acquired virtues are like a sleepy prudent person. This 
person has the virtue of prudence but his tiredness hinders him from 
acting prudently. So, despite the Christians’ having the infusion of charity 
and the other infused virtues, “they can still find it difficult to exercise the 
virtues which they have received as dispositions, because the tendencies 
resulting from their earlier sinful activity remain in them” (On the Cardinal 
Virtues, 2, ad 2).59 But someone who has the acquired virtues is readily dis-
posed to perform virtuous actions. For example, we expect someone with 
acquired temperance to be more able to perform the actions of infused 
temperance, for she is used to subordinating her sensible desires to some 
higher good. Thus, Christians’ charity can direct such virtues to aid them 
in performing virtuous actions.
Therefore, the acquired virtues offer important contributions to the 
highest ethical life. The perfect acquired virtues direct us to human goods, 
and if “this particular good be a true good, for instance the welfare of the 
state, or the like, it will indeed be a true virtue, imperfect, however, unless 
it be referred to the final and perfect good” (ST II-II.23.7).60 The imperfect 
virtues become part of the highest ethical life through charity and play 
important roles in the Christian life.
Conclusion
Although Stump offers an intriguing account of Aquinas’s view of the 
moral life, the acquired or Aristotelian virtues have greater moral sig-
nificance for Aquinas than she allows. Aquinas thinks that non-Christians 
can have morally valuable virtues that are “true but imperfect” relative to 
infused virtues. Moreover, Aristotelian virtues can play important roles in 
the Christian life. Aquinas thus offers a nuanced account that defends the 
superiority of infused virtues without denying the importance and value 
of acquired virtues. If I am correct, then Aquinas’s ethics becomes more 
plausible first by avoiding what Bonnie Kent calls “moral provincialism” 
and admitting some true virtue in those who aren’t Christians.61
The interaction between the infused and acquired virtues is also one 
place where grace and nature interact. When considering the relationship 
57quod quia a principio virtus infusa non semper ita tollit sensum passionum sicut virtus 
acquisita, propter hoc a principio non ita delectabiliter operatur.
58quod cum habitus secundum se facit prompte et delectabiliter operari.
59sed propter dispositiones ex actibus priorum peccatorum relictas patitur difficultatem 
in executione virtutum quas habitualiter recipit.
60Si vero illud bonum particulare sit verum bonum, puta conservatio civitatis vel aliquid 
huiusmodi, erit quidem vera virtus, sed imperfecta, nisi referatur ad finale et perfectum 
bonum. 
61Bonnie Kent, Religious Studies 30 (1994): 269–285
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between sacred doctrine (grace) and philosophy (nature) Aquinas explains 
how he understands the relationship:
But sacred doctrine makes use even of human reason, not, indeed, to prove 
faith (for thereby the merit of faith would come to an end), but to make clear 
other things that are put forward in this doctrine. Since therefore grace does 
not destroy nature but perfects it, natural reason should minister to faith as the 
natural bent of the will ministers to charity. (ST I.1.8.ad 2, emphasis mine)62
Philosophy, like the acquired virtues, is something good and noble, but 
imperfect in relation to the grace that perfects it. Similar to the relation-
ship I explained between the acquired and infused virtues, philosophy 
aids sacred doctrine in a number of ways without being necessary for it. 
Christian philosophers must wrestle with the relationship between grace 
and nature. Aquinas offers a powerful general account that is, if my argu-
ments are successful in reply to Stump, consistently and plausibly applied 
in the relation between the infused and acquired virtues. The reality of 
the acquired virtues makes Aquinas’s account of both the moral life and 
the relationship between grace and nature more plausible. The acquired 
virtues, I have argued, are real goods that are elevated by charity and 
contribute to our supernatural life.63
Baylor University
62Utitur tamen sacra doctrina etiam ratione humana: non quidem ad probandum fidem, 
quia per hoc tolleretur meritum fidei; sed ad manifestandum aliqua alia quae traduntur in 
hac doctrina. Cum enim gratia non tollat naturam, sed perficiat, oportet quod naturalis ratio 
subserviat fidei; sicut et naturalis inclinatio voluntatis obsequitur caritati. 
63Thank you to Alina Beary, Rebecca Konyndyk DeYoung, Robert Kruschwitz, Christian 
Miller, Caryn Rempe, Robert C. Roberts, Christina Van Dyke, Ryan West, and two anony-
mous referees for Faith and Philosophy for providing helpful feedback on this paper.
